Our way, not the Huawei — for the sake of national security
Boris Johnson might have been forgiven for thinking that the biggest dilemma he inherited from Theresa May would be how to resolve Brexit.
But a second straggler from the May era has reared its head to disrupt the post-election serenity.
How the Prime Minister chooses to deal with it may have long-term effects as important in their own way as Brexit to the UK’s future path.
When the question of whether to include the Chinese-owned telecommunications giant Huawei’s offering within the UK’s 5G infrastructure network first arose, it sparked cabinet chaos.
An unprecedented leak from the National Security Council discussion — which claimed the scalp of the defence secretary Gavin Williamson — revealed that all the ministers with security or foreign affairs within their portfolios opposed the idea. After accusations that the government might be weighting trade and technology considerations above national security ones, the Huawei conundrum was kicked into the long grass.
But time does not stand still. The Huawei decision is now back on the agenda, requiring a resolution — and unfortunately for the government, the basic facts remain the same.
Huawei enjoys a headstart in the provision of 5G services, thanks to the massive subsidies it has received from China to ensure that it is a market leader in the information pathway of the future. It is therefore highly tempting for countries to adopt the Huawei model, as it is the quickest and most powerful roll-out of 5G services currently available.
If the vendor were a normal company in a liberal democracy, no eyes would be batted at this.
But Huawei is none of those things. It is a state champion of an oppressive regime that requires — through the 2017 National Intelligence Law — Chinese companies to cooperate with the intelligence services, and which has already used Huawei technology to enforce repression of Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang province.
Huawei has also been accused of corporate espionage in the past, and of having personnel links to Chinese intelligence.
The company’s relationship to the Chinese government has been questioned too, on account of the state’s aggressive lobbying for its services.
Beijing has not been shy in threatening countries like Germany and Denmark with economic consequences should Huawei be banned from their 5G networks. Similar threats have been made in the UK, with China’s ambassador Liu Xiaoming warning that future investment decisions are riding on the issue.
Huawei denies the allegations that it is a catspaw of the state. But it would say that, wouldn’t it.
The British government has conceded that the fears about Huawei’s provenance are justified, and that the company should be barred from the core functions of the 5G network where sensitive data resides.
The National Cyber Security Centre did, however, come up with the clever ruse that the risk could be mitigated if Huawei were restricted to providing services at the periphery of 5G, such as antennas and routers.
However, another report by the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, a committee set up specifically to examine the use of Huawei’s equipment in UK infrastructure, has challenged this suggestion.
Its conclusion was that “identification of shortcomings in Huawei’s engineering processes have exposed new risks in the UK telecommunication networks” and that it has “only limited assurance” that Huawei capabilities were safe.
Added to fears that the software evolution of 5G is likely to blur the boundaries between core and peripheral areas of the network, this verdict should be taken seriously.
But it is the attitude of our closest intelligence allies that should give the greatest cause for concern. Britain’s Five-Eyes intelligence community partners — the US, Australia and New Zealand — have effectively banned Huawei from operating their critical infrastructure.
Friendlier alternatives such as Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung have been invoked as ways to get around Huawei’s market dominance, with suggestions that the UK could join in a shared approach to improving capabilities to reduce the technological gap.
The US has also warned that there will be dire consequences for intelligence sharing should Huawei be allowed access to UK 5G services.
Thus far, the British government seems to believe that this is all bluster and that the Americans will not restrict intelligence flows. But British officials should recall that the last government which mused similarly about US red lines was that of Iran — a day before the Qassem Soleimani drone strike.
The legitimate security and alliance concerns about Huawei therefore require careful consideration.
This is a government committed to “taking back control”. It would be a strange state of affairs indeed for it to cede power over our technological future to Huawei, and thereby also potentially to a country — China — with uncertain future strategic objectives, and which has a long track record of using any and all means at its disposal to achieve what it wants.
Main image credit: Getty