THE EVIDENCE THAT LED TO BARCLAYS’ DOOR

ril

ril 2006: Email
(Trader C requested low one-month and three-month US dollar LIBOR submissions)

Trader C:
“If it’s not too late low 1m and 3m would be nice, but please feel free to say “no”...Coffees will be coming your way either way, just to say thank you for your help in the past few weeks”.

Submitter:
“Done…for you big boy”.

12 February 2007: Instant Messenger
Barclays trader E to various traders at panel banks:
“if you know how to keep a secret I’ll bring you in on it […]”
“we’re going to push the cash downwards on the imm day […]”
“if you breathe a word of this I’m not telling you anything else […]”
“I know my treasury’s firepower…which will push the cash downwards […]”
“please keep it to yourself otherwise it won’t work”

8 October 2008: Phone call
Submitter: “[Manager E]’s asked me to put it [Barclays’ Libor submission] lower than it was yesterday … to send the message that we’re not in the s**t”.

26 October 2006: Email
(Barclays submission on that day for three month US dollar LIBOR was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather than being unchanged.)

External Trader:
“If it comes in unchanged I’m a dead man”

Trader G:
“I’ll have a chat”.

External Trader:
“Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger”.

26 September 2007: Email
(The submitter had been made aware by a senior manager that he should not know what the derivatives traders’ positions were)

Barclays derivatives Trader:
“We’re all rooting for a high LIBOR tomorrow”

Submitter:
“I reckon you should be about four to five ticks higher”.